Monday, October 10, 2016
The Private Insurance Relationship Contract | Social Technology No. 3
This is part of a series focused on technologies and systems.
The feminist left doesn't like marriage and has endeavored to undermine it. They have mostly succeeded. Men don't want to get married because marriage is a guarantee of wealth transfer with no corresponding guarantee of sex or wifely obligation. Since a woman has an incentive to walk away, and a man has an incentive to stay, the effect is to corrupt the very nature of the relationship.
Women cannot respect week men and don't put out for them. By paying women in the divorce every man is weakened and loses respect in the eyes of his wife. Moreover, because she knows he is week she mistreats him, which dramatically raises the divorce rate, since the biggest predictor of divorce is contempt of one partner toward the other.
The result is that the long arm of the state reaches into the bedrooms of people and alters the nature of their relationships without them even realizing it. Then marriage, like capitalism, get blamed by people for the actions of the state corrupting it, since cognitive misers never place the blame in the correct location, preferring to blame the effect, (marriage), rather than the cause, (state incentives corrupting marriage).
Liberals are so trapped in their normative childish delusion of how they think the world ought to work that they either do not see the consequences of their actions, or do not care.
"The universe must be made moral !," said every ovenable fanatic ever.
In a just world, having power and also putting morality above reality should earn a man the death penalty.
Here at NRx we are constantly searching for exit tech. The blockchain promises to create a method for decentralized uncensorable private contracts. These could be especially uncensorable if the contract is issued by a company in a foreign country. So the question becomes; how do you structure an enforceable marriage contract without local courts?
Ultimately marriage incentives are financial, so that helps.
One method is like insurance. The couple sign the contract. In the advent of divorce the husband and wife both pay, oh say, $ 20,000 dollars. The wife gets $ 167 dollars as a monthly payout for each month she is married. The insurance company only looses money if they both make it to the 20 year mark, because 167 per month x 12 months per year x 20 years = about 40k, which it what the couple would pay for getting divorced, (2 people x 20k).
Because a percentage of couples get divorced in any given year the insurance company always makes money collecting divorce debts. The divorced people subsidized the married ones.
There are two potential problems with this method. One, is that it may incentivize the marriage agency to want couples to get divorced. The second is that it relies on debt enforcement in the U.S. through local courts.
A second method is to structure it like an annuity. The couple makes monthly payments into the marriage contract. The contract builds up value and after a certain number of years the wife is awarded a payout in the form of either cash or benefits, (say child care benefits). Marriage is then an investment from her perspective. Since the payout is structured on a time basis there is no incentive for divorce, though a woman may wait until the payout date to get divorced. The money can also be rolled over into a new policy which builds even more value. This also has the benefit of being a financial product that could be sold through the blockchain from overseas, since no debt enforcement is required.
A third method is not to pay the woman but her family, father, or social circle. That way they have an investment in her marriage. The policy could build up a store of value that pays the female friends of the woman after a certain date. Thus, the female friends have an incentive to behave themselves and be supportive of her. This is also an insurance against adultery by other women with her husband.
Another method is to give custody to the father (husband) and debt to the mother (wife) in the advent of divorce. This may seem counterintuitive. But generally the husband does not want custody and the wife does not want to loose money. This works precisely because it is the opposite of what the American family court system would do. Unlike the current court system, this divorce is a penalty for both spouses. The couple can rescind a portion of the wife's debt by getting remarried. This suffers from the flaw that it involves the family court system, or at least a private arbiter, and the U.S. court system could undermine it with corruption.
Maybe the arbiter could himself be private and the police could be privateers.
Of course, other marriage methods may be done, and all methods may be combined with one another.
Also, the more forms of property are on the blockchain the more enforceable a marriage contract can become as other forms of property are linked to it. See this list for an understanding of how extensive it could be. It begins to take on the form of completely private government.
And so we see that some marriage contracts might be enforceable even without government involvement by simply structuring it all as a financial product.