The Left and Right Gatekeep Each Other to Keep the Pedoelite In Power. Also Some Design Thinking to Possibly Defeat it

Two forces: compromise and money

The centrist cuckservatives (on the right) and neoliberal shills (on the left) can always say "there is no alternative to us so you have to vote for us even if we betray the mission." They use the fear of the radicals in the posing parties to gate keep their own party and prevent radicals from emerging. Whether this is Bernie Sanders or Nick Fuentes the extremes are always excluded by the mainstream power structure of their own party.

Systems: One-to-many (hierarchies), many-to-many (networks).

War: the inevitable outcome of hierarchies.

One-to-many systems are hierarchies. They are based on asymmetries of need. You need your boss for 100% of your income (assuming you do not have a second employer). Your boss needs to for like 1% of their labor supply or less. Ergo, your boss has control over you. Hierarchies stack asymmetries of need: you need your boss, who needs his boss, who needs his boss, and so forth. Stacks of asymmetry are one-to-many systems. If your boss needed you as much as you needed him you would become difficult to fire.

War and terrorism both involve the same activity of targeting the populations (assets) of governments. Terrorism is when you do it, war is when the government does it. It's not terrorism when the government does it, it is classified as war instead.

War happens because leaders of hierarchies conclude they can wage terrorism on each other's human farm animals (assets) instead of the more risky direct combat between leaders. Leaders wage terrorism because it is a cowardly way to humiliate the other leader and punish them without risk to oneself. 

Types of currency: money, vouchers, and votes.

Chess pieces: Queen, King, Rook, Knight, Bishop, Pawn.

Money is a vote you can do anything with. You can give it to others, trade it for anything, receive it from others, and loan it for interest (more money). You can even control how Congressmen vote by giving them money. Money is the Queen on the chess board: the player with the most freedom of movement, the most powerful player. This is especially true of cash.

Votes are the weakest player. You can only use a vote for one purpose, one time, for one out of two or more candidates. The only thing you can do with a vote is control—who is elected—who will then control the one-to-many system—that controls you, and even then your vote is aggregated (watered down) with the votes of others. A vote is money you can't do hardly anything with.

A voucher is the weird in-between thing. You can only do what the voucher allows you to do according to whatever rules are attached to the voucher. If money becomes a digital currency it will become a voucher. Since bank accounts can be frozen any money in a bank account is already a kind of voucher. Though vouchers can usually only be used for one intended purpose to pay one provider among a range of providers any form of money with limits and restrictions is more or less a voucher. The more laws there are telling you what you are not allowed to do with your money the more like a voucher it becomes. A law that says you cannot gamble is now a voucher that can be used for anything but gambling. A law that says you cannot buy cocaine turns the money in your wallet into a voucher that can be used for anything but cocaine, etc.

Money is the queen on the chess board, votes are weak like pawns, and vouchers are something else and can become worthless at the discretion of the issuer. 

So far power is based on money + hierarchy (stacked asymmetry of need). We are searching to design some bottom-up solution; a kind of super-hive that controls one-to-many systems. It's an interesting thought exercise and the problems created by hierarchies are legendary: war, subjugation, abuse, getting fired.

Potential Alternative Designs

Iteration #1: Review-Based SuperPAC

In a Review Democracy people vote to approve or disapprove of the actions of their leaders. This then determines a ranking, which in-turn determines whether or not they are allowed to run for office. But we want to construct a collection of techniques that counteract the abuse of one-to-many systems altogether. What systems could wreck hierarchy?

One possibility is to use Review Democracy to determine a voucher for a donor. We know that Congress is controlled by the donor class. We know we can use Review Democracy to control what a leader does. Ergo we can construct a system where everyone contributes money to an account holder that then has the ability to spend that money on elected officials in order to reward them for voting certain ways (it's not technically bribery to reward an action as the payment comes after). Let us call the account holder the trustee.

The trustee tips politicians for voting for or against certain bills. The trustee then lists what bills they rewarded in a report. The Review Democracy reviews the actions of the trustee on a regular basis by reading the report and decides whether or not to increase or decrease their budget. There are multiple competing trustees. This still suffers from the principal-agent problem since the trustee can lie about what they are paying for. A trustee whose budget has been reduced to zero has basically been fired and while having competing trustees makes firing one easier it does not completely eliminate the possibility of lying by any one agent.

Iteration # 2: SuperPAC Social Network

We cut out the middleman and have a kind of social media system determine the amount each politician gets tipped. You sign up for a membership and pay a monthly fee. Then your fees are used to give you points that you can tip politicians for their actions. You can give a politician a tip by reviewing an action and voting "approve" or "disapprove" of that action. Approve gives them points and disapprove takes points away. You can earn points by finding things to approve and linking to a source in a process similar to community notes. There is a small staff that ensures that all votes get added to the review system even if the users overlook it. When an action by a politician (a vote on a bill or signing an executive order) receives more approvals than disapprovals the politician gets a payment. Some sort of algorithm determines the value of each payment and value of points. 

This basically lets millions of users co-ordinate campaign contributions accoring to whatever their shared values are.

I asked ChatGPT for a critique of this idea. Here are some snippets:

2. Theoretical Problems

2.1 Reviewing actions is not equivalent to reviewing governance quality

Most politician decisions are:

• highly technical,filled with tradeoffs,short-term unpopular but long-term beneficial,or long-term harmful but superficially appealing.

A review system risks:

• incentivizing symbolic gestures over structural reforms, punishing necessary but unpopular decisions, rewarding performative behavior, messaging bills, and optics.

This is Goodhart’s Law: once a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.

2.2 Voters are not ideal reviewers

Most voters cannot track:

• thousands of bill amendments, committee actions, procedural votes, ambiguous or strategic “no” votes.

Yeah but there very existence of such a market creates disincentive for procedural votes. 

Your staff can help, but this creates a new bottleneck and potential bias injection point.

3. Incentive/Mechanism Design Issues

3.1 Sybil attacks & brigading

Unless each member is verified and contributions are identity-linked, you get:

• bot armies, partisan brigading, or billionaire-funded mass accounts.

Easy enough to prevent. 

If verification is enforced, then:

• cost of membership becomes a barrier, inequalities re-emerge through “whale users”.

3.2 Transparency paradox

If all payments are public:

• politicians will optimize for visible, rewardable actions, but real governance often happens in dark, procedural corners.

Which the system will bring to light. 

If payments are less transparent:

• the system becomes vulnerable to manipulation, you risk reintroducing the trustee problem.

3.3 Incentive to sensationalize

Any approval/disapproval system tends toward:

• outrage-driven feedback, shallow metrics, popularity-contest dynamics.

Feature not a bug. 

You'll create a “TikTok politics” ecosystem where attention equals money.

4. Legal/Regulatory Issues (U.S.-specific)

4.1 This almost certainly counts as a coordinated expenditure

The FEC is extremely likely to treat this as:

a PAC,

• making contributions to candidates, coordinated based on explicit political actions.

Could definitely be a problem.

This could violate:

• coordination rules, contribution limits (per donor per candidate), independent expenditure restrictions, anti-bribery statutes if intent can be inferred.

The argument “it’s not bribery because it’s after the action” rarely holds legally. Quid pro quo can be inferred from patterns.

4.2 The system risks enabling legalized bribery at scale

Even if technically legal, it resembles:

• mass micro-bribery, tied to specific votes, algorithmically enforced.

So what. 

Courts might strike it down or impose severe restrictions.

6.1 Tip actions indirectly via issue-area outcomes

Instead of rewarding votes:

• reward performance metrics (e.g., constituents’ economic well-being), reward bipartisan or evidence-based behaviors, reward procedural transparency.

No we are not doing Futarchy. 

6.2 Use random citizen assemblies to curate review categories

Avoid direct mob dynamics by embedding deliberative mini-publics.

Nope, that gives SJWs a way in. 

6.3 Introduce anti-Goodhart safeguards

For example:

• no financial rewards tied to single votes, reward accuracy in predicting bill impacts over time,

This is just a prediction market by other means. 

• delay payouts until after multi-year evaluation.

This might be a good idea since it prevents Goodhart's Law but it could also water down the effect of rewards if virtue signaling gets into the mix. Perhaps speeches should only be punished and not rewarded. 

6.4 Make the platform an opinion-aggregator, not a payment system

You could separate:

• user sentiment tracking, donation routing, politician engagement.

This would be more legally feasible.

Weakens the effect though. 

7. Summary

Strengths

• Creative attempt to democratize political influence.
• Correct diagnosis of principal-agent and donor-class problems.
• Clever mechanism in decentralizing “trustee” authority.
• Draws on familiar user-interface paradigms. 

Weaknesses

• Risks turning governance into a popularity contest.
• Highly vulnerable to manipulation and polarization.
• Legally likely to be considered coordinated bribery.
• Goodhart’s Law: incentivizes performative rather than substantive governance.
• Overestimates voter ability to review complex actions.
• Creates new bottlenecks despite attempts to remove them.

 "Legally likely to be considered coordinated bribery" is a killer here.

Overall:

The idea is bold and intellectually stimulating, but in its current form it would likely produce pathological incentives, legal conflicts, and severe vulnerability to manipulation. Some elements (community-based review, decentralized tracking of politician behavior, aggregated micro-donations) are promising if restructured to avoid direct pay-for-vote dynamics.

The discussion continues here if you want to see some raw output.

What if we have three levels? If money has the most optionality, vouchers less, and votes the least, what if society is organized into levels where more power means less optionality?

In this monetary architecture, society is organized into three layers of capability objects: money, vouchers, and votes. Money is held by the poor and middle class and operates as true, unconstrained currency. It retains full optionality, meaning it can be used to buy anything, pay anyone, donate freely, invest, save, loan, with no restrictions or programming imposed by any authority. Ordinary people may hold and use money because their accumulation of it does not pose a systemic threat; their financial movements cannot distort politics or governance at scale. For them, money functions as the queen on the chessboard, the most flexible and powerful instrument in daily life.

 

The wealthy, by contrast, do not hold money at all once their assets exceed a certain threshold. Everything above that line is automatically converted into vouchers. These vouchers look like wealth, but they have reduced optionality and are limited by design. They can be used only inside approved domains such as capital markets, philanthropic channels, investment networks, and political review systems. They cannot buy direct political power, cannot serve as bribes, cannot be converted back into money, and cannot purchase coercive capacity. Their effectiveness is governed by a mechanism called Review Democracy, in which ordinary citizens rate wealthy actors according to transparency, fairness, trustworthiness, and behavior. The rating directly affects the strength of the vouchers: good behavior amplifies their influence, while bad behavior weakens or nullifies them. This transforms large-scale wealth into a conditional privilege rather than a blunt instrument of domination.

 

Politicians, in the third layer, do not use either money or vouchers. They hold votes, which are the weakest and most narrowly defined capability object. Votes can be used only within the governance system to elect internal leaders, pass internal rules, allocate budgets, and maintain the institutional charter.

To limit the corruption of politicans they get their own kind of voucher as payment for services and this voucher is not directly convertable to cash. 

Together, the three layers interact through a strict one-way flow. Money may convert upward into vouchers when someone becomes wealthy, but vouchers never convert back into money. Vouchers may influence political oversight systems through review democracy, but cannot compel or corrupt politicians, whose votes remain sealed off from economic exchange. Votes (in theory) cannot convert into anything else. This sealing of each layer prevents cross-contamination and ensures that no single class of capability object can capture the entire system. The result is a private-sector order where ordinary people retain genuine monetary freedom, the rich are constrained to a supervised form of influence, politicians remain unbribable, and the overall structure prevents hierarchy from becoming abusive or self-reinforcing.

Or so we hope. In reality their would be plenty of cross contamination. But these elites are paid entirely in vouchers which are traceable, and diminish in value when they get out of line. There are powerful incentives here to keep them whipped. If leaders cannot be trusted with power let them be whipped little bitches.

Do you think it would work and do you have a better idea?